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POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY AND THE
LAW OF HIGH SPEED PURSUIT*
RICHARD G. ZEVITZ**
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the invention of the automobile, no aspect of Ameri-
can life, including crime and its control, has remained un-
touched by this far-reaching innovation in transportation.
Vehicular "hot pursuit"-when suspects in motor vehicles
use excessive speed in attempting to elude the police-is one
way in which the automobile has affected the behavior of both
criminals and law enforcers.
Unfortunately, accounts of wild chases across crowded in-
ner city streets, through tree-lined suburban boulevards, and
over remote country roads are very real and not merely fic-
tional material created for entertaining television and motion
picture audiences. The specter of "hot pursuit," complete
with screaming sirens and red or blue flashing lights, has be-
come a recurring fact of modem life.1 So, too, are the mishaps
involving police vehicles or the vehicles pursued by the police.
Pursuit-related accidents causing personal injury, death or
property damage very often lead to lawsuits claiming negli-
gence on the part of police officers, their supervisors and their
governmental employers. Some of these suits have resulted in
six or seven figure awards and several have nearly bankrupted
some municipalities and townships.
These crippling judgments have given rise to a growing re-
alization that the deadly business of police high speed pursuit
presents a serious problem that needs to be addressed. As
with so many other contemporary problems in our society, the
* Prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the American Society of
Criminology, October 1986.
** J.D., University of Nebraska Law School; Ph.D., University of California. As-
sistant Professor of Criminology and Sociology, College of Arts and Sciences, Mar-
quette University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Kevin T.
Smith, Editor-in-Chief, Marquette Law Review, in the preparation of this article.
1. It has been estimated that between 50,000 and 500,000 high speed pursuits take
place each year in the United States. See E. FENNESSY, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., A
STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF HOT PuRsurr BY THE POLICE (1970).
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American public has looked to legislation for a solution. Be-
cause of the complex nature of the police pursuit problem,
state legislatures have tended to pass laws that provide only
the general framework around which specific regulatory poli-
cies are to be locally formulated. Such is the status of the law
in Wisconsin, where an amendment to the statute governing
high speed police chases was adopted in 1985.2
The focus of this article is upon governmental tort liability
for negligence during high speed police chases. Particular at-
tention will be directed to the legal consequences of local law
enforcement policies regulating speed pursuits by police emer-
gency vehicles. After an initial study of Wisconsin's new high
speed chase law and the rationale for its adoption, the discus-
sion will turn to an analysis of important legal issues involved
in cases of alleged negligent police pursuit. Lastly, an alterna-
tive standard for measuring governmental liability in pursuit-
related accidents is suggested as a means to better serve the
interests of the public.
I. THE CASE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRAINTS
Since November 27, 1985, law enforcement agencies in
Wisconsin have been required to provide written guidelines
for their officers regarding high speed pursuits of actual or
suspected lawbreakers. Wisconsin thus joins the growing list
of states which mandate formalized pursuit guidelines for
emergency police vehicles. Even before pursuit guidelines
were required, and in many places where there is still no such
legal requirement, thousands of law enforcement agencies
throughout the nation adopted official policies setting forth
those circumstances under which high speed pursuit was per-
mitted. Regardless of the motivation for their adoption, all
such policies seemed to share a common objective: to main-
2. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(6) (1985-86) (originally enacted by 1985 Wis. Laws 82,
§ 2M; eft. Nov. 27, 1985).
3. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(6) (1985-86) provides:
Every law enforcement agency which uses authorized emergency vehicles shall
provide written guidelines for its officers and employes regarding exceeding
speed limits when in pursuit of actual or suspected violators. The guidelines
shall consider, among other factors, road conditions, density of population, se-
verity of crime and necessity of pursuit by vehicle. The guidelines are not subject
to requirements for rules under ch. 227.
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tain a high apprehension rate of fleeing suspects without un-
due risk to life or property.
While it is true that most high speed pursuits result in the
capture and arrest of a fleeing suspect, the price paid for some
of these apprehensions has been high. Many fatalities and se-
rious injuries occur each year as a consequence of pursuit-re-
lated accidents. In fact, it has been established that
approximately one-fifth of all police pursuits culminate in
some type of collision involving the vehicle of the pursued sus-
pect, a police officer or an innocent third party.4 The rela-
tively high ratio of pursuit-related accidents has had its
parallel in costly pursuit-related lawsuits. In a survey con-
ducted for the International Association of Chiefs of Police,5
it was found that in a ten year period from 1967 through 1976,
plaintiff verdicts in high speed chase litigation ranked second
4. Based on a survey of law enforcement agencies in the United States, it has been
estimated that pursuit-related collisions account for 18.8% of all injury accidents sus-
tained by police drivers. See International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., Police
Fleet Crash Study 12 (July 1986) (unpublished). In a study of 289 traffic accidents
involving police vehicles in the City of Milwaukee in 1985, 118 (41%) occurred while
the police vehicle was acting in an emergency capacity. Of these 118 emergency-related
vehicular collisions, 36 (30%) involved pursuit of a fleeing violator or suspect. In turn,
the injury rate for pursuit-related collisons was 39%. Milwaukee Safety Commission,
Report of Traffic Accidents Involving Police Vehicles 4 (1985).
A recent nationwide survey found that property damage occurred in about one of
every five pursuits, while there were injuries in one in seven and deaths in one in approx-
imately thirty-five pursuits. See Beckman, Pursuit Driving, MICH. POLICE CHIEFS, May
1986, at 26-34. Another survey conducted in California revealed that 29% of all pur-
suits involved collisions, and 11% resulted in bodily injury. See Dep't of the Cal. High-
way Patrol, Pursuit Study 22 (1983) [hereinafter CHP, Pursuit Study].
5. See W. SCHMIDT, SURVEY OF POLICE MISCONDUCT LITIGATION: 1967-1976
(1977). The survey included a cross-section of 2060 law enforcement agencies that em-
ployed 153,130 officers, or about one-fourth of the nation's total. The following table,
which is based on data from the survey, is an extrapolation of the number of motor
vehicle negligence suits for the entire law enforcement community:












among police civil liability suits in terms of dollar amount
awarded, exceeded only by misuse of firearm or nightstick
cases.6 An informal survey of police misconduct litigation in
eleven states indicates that not only has the number of pur-
suit-connected tort actions risen dramatically, but so has the
size of damage awards ensuing from such actions, although
the percentage increases are not known.7
The high toll arising from pursuit-related collisions, espe-
cially those resulting in death, serious injury or extensive
property destruction, has not gone unnoticed. Concerned pri-
vate citizens and a number of elected officials are questioning
the wisdom of allowing high speed chases in many of the cases
that have received news media attention.8 These concerns
have been echoed in several newspaper editorials urging that
tighter restrictions be placed on hot pursuit by the police. 9 A
6. For a discussion of trends in lawsuits against police based upon portions of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police survey, see Schmidt, Recent Developments
in Police Civil Liability, 4 J. POLICE ScI. & ADMIN. 197 (1976). In terms of number of
suits filed, motor vehicle claims - the vast majority of which alleged negligence during
emergency operations - constituted 14% of all lawsuits filed against police, compared
to only 5.4% for firearm-related death or injury. There were 1.15 motor vehicle law-
suits per 100 officers during the survey period, compared to 2.01 non-firearm excess
force suits per 100 and 0.44 firearm-related suits per 100 for the same period. The
survey included law suits filed against local police, county sheriffs, federal agents, state
patrolmen, campus police, railroad police and other specialized law enforcement
personnel.
7. The states canvassed by the author were: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska and Oregon.
8. For example, shortly after an innocent motorist was killed when a driver fleeing
police slammed into his car, State Senator Lynn S. Adelman and State Representative
Marcia P. Coggs sent letters to the Milwaukee Police and Fire Commission urging the
Police Department to make its high speed chase policy more specific. In this particular
accident, the police began the chase after noticing the car had no license plates. Adel-
man was instrumental in passage of 1985 Wis. Laws 82 relating to high speed pursuit
guidelines and increasing penalties for eluding a traffic officer. WIS. STAT.
§ 346.17(3)(b)-(d) (1985-86). The new law was written after high speed chases resulted
in the deaths of the fleeing individuals and innocent citizens. See Riepenhoff, Officer
Liability Still in Question, Milwaukee J., Oct. 16, 1986, at 3B, col. 4; Lanke, Tighter
Chase Policy for Police Is Asked, Milwaukee Sentinel, Sept. 4, 1986; Letters from Sena-
tor Lynn S. Adelman to Police Chief Robert J. Ziarnik and the Milwaukee Fire and
Police Commission (July 29, 1986; Aug. 28, 1986; Sept. 17, 1986) (on file with the
Commission); Letter from Representative Marcia P. Coggs to the Milwaukee Fire and
Police Commission (Sept. 4, 1986) (on file with the Commission).
9. See generally Did Police Chase Cause Lethal Crash?, Milwaukee J., July 10,
1986, at 12A, col. 3 ("was the mere suspicion of wrongdoing enough reason to instigate
a chase, with all its attendant dangers? Was the absence of license plates enough rea-
son?"); Police Need Guidance for Hot Pursuit, Milwaukee J., Feb. 20, 1986, Pt. 1, at 10,
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number of experts are in accord with the public demand for
greater restraint in police use of high speed chases. One such
expert, Leonard Territo, who surveyed high speed pursuit pol-
icies in thirty-seven different states, concluded that there was
a clear need to "impose strong controls upon the operation of
police vehicles in emergency responses and high speed pur-
suits if there is to be a reduction in the increasing number of
injuries and deaths."10 Also, expert Eric Beckman reached a
similar conclusion in favor of pursuit restrictions in his study
referred to above."1
Both Territo and Beckman take the position that a well
conceived and clearly defined set of departmental guidelines
for pursuit driving, if properly reinforced by training and su-
pervision, will at the very least reduce some of the risks in-
volved in this inherently dangerous police activity. 12
Although this assumption has never been empirically tested, 13
its inherent logic has had strong appeal to state lawmakers,
judging by the amount of legislation enacted in recent years
requiring police administrators to provide written pursuit
guidelines. Passing over, for the moment, the question of
whether these guidelines have proved effective in reducing the
number of collisions involving police pursuit vehicles, these
departmental policy directives have had important repercus-
sions for litigation involving the issue of negligent police pur-
suit,1 4 even where the agency in question lacks an official
col. 1 ("Sometimes, officers give high-speed chase when nothing more serious than a
traffic violation is involved.").
10. Territo, Citizen Safety: Key Element in Police Pursuit Policy, 18 TRIAL, Aug.
1982, at 31, 32.
11. See Beckman, supra note 4.
12. Territo, supra note 10, at 32; Beckman, supra note 4, at 34.
13. Social science research in another area of police work that also involves deadly
force, namely police shootings, appears to indicate that more restrictive firearms poli-
cies, in conjunction with training and supervision, has substantially reduced the number
of police killings in the United States without any accompanying increase in injuries or
killings of police officers or noticeable reduction in arrest activity. L. SHERMAN & E.
COHEN, CITIZENS KILLED BY BIG CITY POLICE (1980).
14. Police departments' safety rules, general orders and procedural manuals, as
well as training bulletins governing the operation of emergency vehicles during pursuit,
are generally admissible into evidence in negligence cases. They have been deemed rele-
vant to what a police driver's standard of care in various pursuit situations should be.
Compliance with such rules may be raised as a defense in negligence actions involving
police pursuits. See Annotation, Municipal Corporation's Safety Rules or Regulations as
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pursuit policy. This article addresses some of those
repercussions.
III. PURSUIT POLICIES AND LIABILITY
Law enforcement policies and procedures governing high
speed chases have become the major point of contention in
litigation on the question of police liability for pursuit-in-
curred property damage or bodily injury. In particular, two
frequently raised issues relating to internal departmental pol-
icy have a direct bearing on the tort liability of police person-
nel and their employers. A third issue, although only
indirectly related to departmental pursuit guidelines, enters
into an increasing number of courtroom contests over police
liability. All three issues and their growing significance for
lawsuits alleging negligent police pursuits will be discussed.
The first issue involves the standard of care applicable to
such cases. What duty of care is to be imposed on an officer
engaged in a high speed chase where a clearly defined depart-
mental pursuit policy exists?' 5 The second issue for discussion
is whether or not an officer's good faith compliance with de-
partmental procedures for conducting high speed chases acts
as a defense to shield the officer and the employer from liabil-
ity for pursuit-related injury or damage.16 The final issue to
be discussed concerns the relevance of a claim by a plaintiff in
a police negligence case that the law enforcement agency in
Admissible in Evidence in Action by Private Party Against Municipal Corporation or Its
Officers or Employees for Negligent Operation of Vehicle, 82 A.L.R.3D 1285 (1978).
15. The duty of care owed by a driver of an emergency police vehicle may vary
according to jurisdiction, but the underlying principles of negligence are the same from
state to state. In general, the driver of a police vehicle during an emergency situation
must "exercise the care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the dis-
charge of official duties of a like nature under the circumstances." 7A AM. JUR. 2D
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 418 (1980).
16. Some state legislatures have side-stepped this issue by enacting immunity stat-
utes which apply to emergency vehicle operations of police. Although such statutes
absolve from liability the police driver who complies in good faith with departmental
pursuit guidelines, general immunity statutes do not repeal statutory duties of care. For
a discussion of the effect of state immunity statutes in tort actions arising out of the
operation of an emergency vehicle, see I. SILVER, POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY § 3.07
(1986).
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question failed to reinforce its existing pursuit policy through
adequate training and proper supervision. 17
A. Determining the Degree of Care Owed
by Police Pursuit Drivers
Under the general principles of tort liability, the conduct
of a police officer, as with other members of society, is usually
measured by the reasonable person standard. 18 However, in
the law of negligence, the police are viewed in a different light
than the ordinary citizen. The law demands that they not
only exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also that
they possess a certain amount of special knowledge and abil-
ity. Accordingly, those persons trained as police officers must
conduct themselves in a manner consistent with that train-
ing.19 Thus, in high speed chase situations, pursuing police
officers must use that degree of care which is deemed reason-
able in light of their special training and experience.2 0 The
degree of care exercised in pursuit driving must also be com-
mensurate with the circumstances at hand.2 1 All things con-
sidered, if the manner in which a police officer carries out a
17. See Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied,
469 U.S. 1159 (1985) (applying Virginia law). In this case, the jury found the county
negligent for failing to adequately train and supervise its police officer in high speed
pursuit driving, which was a causal link to plaintiff's injury. Id. at 1356.
18. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984).
19. "Professional persons in general, and those who undertake any work calling for
special skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also
to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability." Id. at 185 (citation
omitted).
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Nieves, 197 N.L Super. 609, 485 A.2d 1066 (Ct. App. Div.
1984). One commentator argues that because civil litigation against municipalities for
high speed pursuit-related injuries is usually based on negligence in training the officers
involved, "[t]he establishment of a good training program would greatly reduce such
causes of action." Carlin, High-Speed Pursuits: Police Officer and Municipal Liability
for Accidents Involving the Pursued and an Innocent Third Party, 16 SETON HALL 101,
119 (1986). However, another writer argues that current state-of-the-art training in
pursuit driving offered by police academies is inadequate. He states:
[W]e can document no training activity that validly prepares officers for this
particular task, viz., driving a police car at high speeds after another car which,
in most cases, has committed a traffic offense, through populated areas, signal-
ized intersections, and roads where the chances of running into other cars are
extremely high.
Confronting a Problem: Some Assistance Needed, 10 TRAINING AIDS DIGFsT 10 (July
1985).
21. 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcrS 2D Police Pursuits § 4 (1985).
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high speed chase falls below the level of skill, care and dili-
gence generally expected of members of the police profession,
that officer may be held liable for injuries or damages resulting
from his or her conduct. For police professionals, that level is
measured by the occupational skill and training commonly ac-
cepted by those who undertake this line of work.22
In determining the appropriate standard of care in actions
alleging negligent police behavior, courts have looked to the
safety rules and regulations of the department to which the
defendant police officer belongs.2 3 This information may be
gathered from the department's manual on standard operating
procedures, from the officer's departmental handbook of rules
and regulations, and from written directives issued by the
chief or from training bulletins. 24 Basing a finding of negli-
gence on a breach of a law enforcement agency's self-imposed
work rules is consistent with the principle in law that holds
tortfeasors to the standards they have set for themselves. 25
Where a departmental procedure clearly prohibits the course
of conduct the officer engaged in, courts have not hesitated to
support a jury determination that negligence existed in an ar-
bitrarily conducted pursuit.26
However, a problem arises in a number of jurisdictions
where statutes or ordinances require a degree of care in con-
ducting a police pursuit that is less restrictive than the stan-
dard which a department has set for itself. This situation
22. See Selkowitz v. County of Nassau, 45 N.Y.2d 97, 379 N.E.2d 1140, 408
N.Y.S.2d 10 (1978).
23. See DeLong v. City & County of Denver, 34 Colo. App. 330, 530 P.2d 1308
(1974), aff'd, 190 Colo. 219, 545 P.2d 154 (1976). In this case, the appellate court ruled
that the trial court erred in refusing to admit police department rules requiring that a
police officer proceeding through a red light in an emergency situation limit his or her
speed to 15 miles per hour. Delong, 34 Colo. App. at -, 530 P.2d at 1309.
24. See Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 472, 446 P.2d 129, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 321 (1968). In this case, the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence a
police department training bulletin recommending a speed of 15 miles per hour while
proceeding against a traffic light through a blind intersection. The plaintiff had brought
a wrongful death action where the deceased had been killed when his car collided at an
intersection with a city police car travelling at 30 miles per hour at the time of the
collision. Id. at -, 446 P.2d at 131, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
25. See C. KRAMER, EVIDENCE IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 14-15 (6th ed. 1977). For
a contrary position, see Schumacher v. City of Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 43, 243 N.W. 756
(1932).
26. See generally Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 1 Cal. App. 2d 529, 81 Cal. Rptr.
821 (1969), vacated, 2 Cal. 3d 575, 468 P.2d 825, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970).
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usually occurs where state statutes or local ordinances exempt
emergency vehicles from compliance with speed and other
traffic regulations when such vehicles are being operated in
the pursuit or apprehension of law violators. While these leg-
islative enactments exempt police pursuit vehicles from speed
and other driving restrictions, they generally rely upon the ap-
plication of prevailing common law standards within a given
jurisdiction for measuring whether or not a speed chase was
properly conducted or even justified under particular circum-
stances.27 A typical statute is that of Wisconsin.28
While Wisconsin law grants the drivers of emergency vehi-
cles the privilege to exceed posted speed limits when such ve-
hicles are being operated in the pursuit of law violators,29 the
statute requires that "due regard" be exercised in pursuits
which would jeopardize the safety of other persons. 30  The
only guidance the statute provides for determining what is or
is not "reasonable" 31 is inferred from its use of the words
"under the circumstances," which requires that one must ex-
amine the exigencies of each chase situation presented.32
Thus, for those in search of a comprehensive state policy gov-
erning police pursuit driving, statutory law offers little assist-
ance. One is compelled to turn to court decisions which, in
Wisconsin, have interpreted such language as requiring opera-
tors of police vehicles to exercise ordinary care.33 That is to
27. See Note, Emergency Vehicles - Standard of Care, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 88
(1957).
28. Wis. STAT. § 346.03 (1985-86) provides an exemption for emergency vehicles
"in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law" permitting the emergency
vehicle to "exceed the speed limit." Additionally, as a limitation, the statute explicitly
states that it "Does] not relieve such operator from the duty to drive with due regard
under the circumstances for the safety of all persons nor do they protect such operator
from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others."
29. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(2)(c) (1985-86).
30. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(5) (1985-86).
31. See Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 857, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1975)
("[N]egligence is to be determined by ascertaining whether the defendant's exercise of
care foreseeably created an unreasonable risk to others.").
32. See Bumette v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 107 Wis. 2d 361, 320 N.W.2d
43 (Ct. App. 1982).
33. See Suren v. Zuege, 186 Wis. 264, 201 N.W. 722 (1925). In this case, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that even though a police pursuit driver was entitled to a
statutory exemption from compliance with the posted speed limitations, he or she was
still under a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the safety of others and
himself. Id. at 267, 201 N.W. at 724. On the other hand, in some jurisdictions, where
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say, in Wisconsin as in most other states, the standard of care
owed by police drivers of pursuit vehicles is that which a rea-
sonably prudent person, faced with official responsibilities of a
law enforcement nature, would exercise under the
circumstances.34
While the intent of the statute granting operators of emer-
gency police vehicles special driving privileges has been inter-
preted to require a duty of ordinary care for the safety of
others and himself, the care required is not the same as that
required of other drivers. 35 For one thing, the pursuit driver
is not subject to posted speed limits nor is he or she deemed
negligent per se for fast driving.36 The police pursuit driver,
under state law, is also released from the strong presumption
of negligence which applies to violations of other traffic safety
laws, such as running stop signs and traffic lights.37 Conse-
quently, in the past, courts in negligence cases have been more
liberal with the operators of police vehicles in giving them the
benefit of the doubt than they have been with other drivers
who do not possess special highway privileges. 38 As long as
police officers involved in high speed chases could demon-
strate that they had exercised some degree of precaution, such
as sounding a siren and using a flashing light, courts tended to
grant them latitude and ample protection.39 Only when they
statutory exemption from speed restrictions also exists, it has been held that such statu-
tory immunity can be denied only if there is evidence of gross negligence. See, e.g.,
Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F. Supp. 271 (D. Vt. 1975). Where a gross negligence standard
applies, the police driver cannot be held liable for negligence unless it can be proven that
he or she was arbitrary in the exercise of the speeding privilege or acted with "reckless
disregard" to the safety of others. Id. See generally Note, supra note 27, at 90; infra
notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
34. Suren, 186 Wis. at 267, 201 N.W. at 724.
35. See Montalto v. Fond du Lac County, 272 Wis. 552, 76 N.W.2d 279 (1956).
36. Suren, 186 Wis. at 267, 201 N.W. at 723-24. The court noted that the statutory
exemption effectively prevents the application of the rule in law that excess speed forms
a prima facie presumption of negligence. To interpret its effect otherwise would be to
render the emergency vehicle provisions of the statute meaningless and thereby nullify
the privileges granted, contrary to the clear intent of the legislature to recognize the
public necessity of apprehending actual or suspected violators.
37. See Campbell, Wisconsin Law Governing Automobile Accidents - Part I, 1962
Wis. L. REV. 240.
38. See Brunette v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 107 Wis. 2d 361, 320 N.W.2d
43 (Ct. App. 1982).
39. See Pedek v. Wegemann, 271 Wis. 461, 74 N.W.2d 198 (1956). The court held
that although a police officer was operating an emergency vehicle, he did not come
under the statutory exemption as to speed restrictions, since his siren was not in opera-
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evidenced a callous indifference for the safety of others were
they held accountable for their actions.4°
Even before the passage of the 1985 act mandating written
pursuit guidelines, a number of law enforcement agencies in
Wisconsin, finding their state's common law standard too
vague to suit their purposes, adopted specific guidelines for
their patrol officers to use in making pursuit decisions.41
These departmental guidelines tended to place more restric-
tions on the decisions leading into high speed pursuits than
the ad hoc decisionmaking that occurs when one follows rele-
vant court decisions. Because these guidelines are generally
more restrictive than decisional law,42 attorneys representing
plaintiffs in police negligence cases have argued that these in-
temal policies of departments should serve as the standard for
measuring the degree of care owed by defendant police officers
in pursuit situations.43 In civil actions alleging negligent po-
lice pursuit, where such policies have been viewed by trial
judges as admissible evidence, judgments for plaintiffs have
been easier to obtain. 44
Consequently, allegations of negligence in hot pursuit
cases have been based on violations of departmental high
tion prior to the intersectional collision of his vehicle and a vehicle operated by the
defendant. Id. at 464, 74 N.W.2d at 199.
40. See id.
41. See, eg., STATE PATROL DIVISION, Wis. DEP'T OF TRANsP., TRAINING BULL.
No. 8, High Speed Pursuit Driving (1983). The Wisconsin State Patrol (WSP) adopted a
policy which states that:
Maximum top speed is justified only when and where it is reasonably safe, i.e., a
clear, straight highway under good weather and road conditions with no visible
or probable conflict with other traffic. At any time due to any of the conditions
listed above, [i.e., weather, traffic or highway problems] or for any other reason,
reduced speed is necessary to provide a reasonable degree of safety to the trooper
and others, the speed must be reduced accordingly. The speed or actions of the
fleeing violator have no bearing on this factor. The danger created by the viola-
tor neither relieves the trooper of his grave responsibility to exercise due care nor
justifies the creation of a similar or greater danger by the trooper to innocent
bystanders or other drivers or pedestrians.
Id. at 3.
42. Compare the "duty to exercise that which under [the] circumstances ... is
reasonable and ordinary care" language, which is the standard of Suren, 186 Wis. at
267, 201 N.W. at 724, with the WSP training bulletin's mandate to reduce speed if
specified hazardous driving conditions are present, supra note 41.
43. Koonz & Regan, Hot Pursuit, 21 TRIAL, Dec. 1985, at 63.
44. Id. at 66.
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speed chase policies. 5 If it can be shown that a defendant
police officer clearly violated his or her department's internal
work rules, which plaintiff's attorney will claim constitutes a
"self-imposed standard of care,"' 46 a major step has been taken
toward convincing a jury that a pursuit was performed negli-
gently. In cases where this has occurred,4 7 defendants have
been held to a greater degree of care than that which was re-
quired by state law.48 The violation of the higher duty im-
posed by what is essentially a self-determined standard of
liability is tantamount to a finding of negligence as a matter of
law.4 9 For all practical purposes, the negligence per se stan-
dard, which had been rendered inapplicable to law enforce-
ment agencies in Wisconsin with the enactment of the statute
granting police vehicle operators special highway privileges,5 0
has returned in the form of the departmental directive and is
now being applied as the current standard for police liability.
With the new law now in effect, which requires law en-
forcement agencies to adopt their own written pursuit guide-
lines, several developments are apt to occur. First, in
searching for a workable standard for liability in hot pursuit
cases, courts will probably continue their present practice of
looking closely at the official policies of police departments
and other law enforcement agencies. The pursuit guidelines
contained in a department's policies and procedures manual51
45. See Schmidt, supra note 6, at 200.
46. Id.
47. See Tetro v. Town of Stratford, 189 Conn. 601, 458 A.2d 5 (1983); Dillenbeck
v. City of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 742, 446 P.2d 129, 72 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968); DeLong
v. City and County of Denver, 34 Colo. App. 330, 530 P.2d 1308 (1974), aff'd, 190
Colo. 219, 545 P.2d 154 (1976).
48. DeLong, 34 Colo. App. 330, 530 P.2d 1308.
49. 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Police Pursuits § 9 (1985).
50. WIS. STAT. § 346.03 (1985-86).
51. See, e.g., MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT, ORDER No. 9491, AMEND-
MENT OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES RELATING To HIGH SPEED PURSUITS
(ef. Jan. 30, 1987). The Miluawkee Police Department (MPD) guideline reads, in part,
as follows:
EMERGENCY VEHICLE OPERATION
A. An emergency situation is one in which the probability of death, personal
injury or the loss or destruction of property exists, and action by a law
enforcement officer may avert or reduce the seriousness of the situation.
B. An "authorized emergency vehicle" is any police vehicle that, when re-
sponding to an emergency call or pursuing an actual or suspected law viola-
tor, has in operation the emergency lights and siren.
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will be increasingly relied upon to determine the duty of care
NOTE: Only officers in marked police vehicles are authorized to charge
persons with violations of Section 346.04(3) of the Wisconsin Vehicle Code
(Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Police Officer).
Routine traffic stops or other instances in which officers activate their emer-
gency lights and sirens and the citizen/ vehicle operator complies by coming
to a stop in a reasonably short distance will not be considered a motor vehi-
cle pursuit.
C. Procedures
These procedures provide Department members with guidelines to follow
when engaged in a motor vehicle pursuit.
I. Restrictions
a.) Officers shall not engage in a motor vehicle pursuit while there is a
citizen occupant in the Department vehicle, including, but not lim-
ited to, arrestees, victims, witnesses or non-sworn members of the
Department.
b.) Police officers operating unmarked Department vehicles may only
engage in a motor vehicle pursuit in the event of an extreme emer-
gency (e.g., when the fleeing motor vehicle represents an immediate
and direct threat to life or property or wherein a substantial loss of
property has occurred).
c.) Whenever a marked Department vehicle becomes available to take
over a vehicle pursuit, the unmarked Department vehicle operator
shall withdraw from active pursuit and shall serve in a support func-
tion for the marked vehicle.
2. Department Vehicle Operators
a.) A Department vehicle operator shall only engage in a motor vehicle
pursuit when:
(1) He/she has activated the emergency roof lights and siren if in a
marked vehicle or has activated the emergency light and siren if
in an unmarked vehicle and the motor vehicle operator refuses
to voluntarily comply with the law requiring him to stop.
(2) He notifies the Communications Division dispatcher of the per-
tinent facts concerning the pursuit and requests assistance in or-
der to apprehend a pursued motor vehicle operator who is
taking evasive action to avoid being apprehended.
(3) The speeds involved and/or the maneuvering practices engaged
in permit the Department vehicle operator complete control of
his vehicle and do not create unwarranted danger to the public
or Department members.
(4) The volume of pedestrian and/or vehicular traffic permits con-
tinuing the pursuit.
(5) Weather and road conditions are not such that the pursuit be-
comes inordinately hazardous.
b.) Police officers engaged in the motor vehicle pursuit of a driver who
is an IMMEDIATE threat to the safety of the public may take rea-
sonable and prudent measures to apprehend the driver without en-
dangering the welfare of others. However, the deliberate striking of
a pursued vehicle or the use of a Department or other vehicle(s) as a
stationary barricade is only permitted to be used as a last resort
when:
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owed by individual officers in high speed chase situations.
They will continue to be interpreted as setting the standard of
care to be applied in pursuit-related personal injury or prop-
erty damage cases where police negligence is alleged.
Self-determined procedural standards for police conduct,
which have now been ruled admissible in a number of jurisdic-
tions,5 2 may very likely be used in future lawsuits as a basis for
jury instructions on the question of what standard to apply on
the issue of police negligence. 3 Critics of these decisions may
well argue that by holding the police responsible for failing to
follow their own internal rules and regulations, courts in effect
are prompting law enforcement agencies to avoid adopting
specific operational guidelines from which liability might sub-
sequently be construed. Nevertheless, by not having guide-
lines or by having guidelines that are so vague that an
inordinate amount of discretion is left to patrol officers, the
individual officer, agency or governmental entity may actually
(1) The occupant(s) of the vehicle being pursued is wanted for a
serious felony, or
(2) The manner in which the pursued vehicle is being operated cre-
ates a substantial risk of serious injury or death.
c.) The Department vehicle operator or supervisor shall terminate a
motor vehicle pursuit when in his/her judgment further pursuit is
not warranted. Some examples of items to be considered are the
volume of pedestrian and/or vehicular traffic, road and weather
hazards or the distance between vehicles indicates that further pur-
suit will create more danger to the public and/or Department mem-
bers than does the conduct of the pursued driver.
d.) When a motor vehicle pursuit is initiated by a law enforcement
agency of another jurisdiction, the initiating unit and jurisdiction
shall be responsible for the progress of the pursuit. Department ve-
hicle operators who become actively involved in the pursuit shall
adhere to all applicable provisions of this directive.
3. Report Required
The Communications Division dispatcher shall dispatch a supervisor to
ther termination point of the pursuit if one has not responded. The
supervisor shall file an In the Matter of report detailing the following
information: time pursuit began, reason suspect fled (if known), ap-
proximate speeds reached, general route of pursuit, time pursuit ended
and charges against suspect. This report shall be forwarded to the Traf-
fic Division which shall serve as a central repository for information
concerning police pursuits.
52. See cases cited supra note 47 and accompanying text.
53. See generally Annotation, supra note 14. This annotation discusses the ques-
tion of using departmental safety rules or regulations to determine the appropriate stan-
dard of care in negligence cases, providing views for and against such a practice.
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be left with less protection from civil liability. This is because,
as one writer has noted,54 where an agency's performance
standards are lacking, courts could look to the written policies
and procedures of similarly situated agencies for guidance in
such matters.5 However, where the statutory requirement for
written pursuit guidelines actually lists certain factors that
must be included,56 some degree of specificity is assured and
vague directives are unlikely.
Another probable consequence in mandating the adoption
of pursuit guidelines for law enforcement agencies is a contin-
uation of the trend toward stricter accountability in delineat-
ing the scope of police liability for the negative consequences
of high speed pursuits. Mandated high speed chase guidelines
will most likely result in a tightening of controls over the se-
ries of officer decisions that enter into police pursuit driving.
Police administrators are already under considerable pressure
to reduce the number of pursuit-related injuries and deaths. 7
Many units of local and county government have had to bear
the brunt of multi-million dollar judgments brought about by
negligently performed high speed chases. Liability insurance
for police patrols, which has always been expensive, has trip-
led or quadrupled in cost in recent years.5 8 For some jurisdic-
tions, liability coverage has become virtually unobtainable.59
54. Note, Negligence of Municipal Employees: Re-defining the Scope of Police Lia-
bility, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 720, 736 (1983).
55. See Bonsignore v. City of New York, 521 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In
this case, the court held that a municipality could be liable for failure to adopt reason-
able procedures to identify emotionally unstable police officers. Police department pro-
cedures for psychological testing were found by the court to be inadequate when
compared to other city police departments. Id. at 402.
56. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(6) (1985-86). See supra note 3 for the full text of the sub-
section of the statute.
57. See generally Barker, Police Pursuit Driving: The Need for Policy, POLICE
CHIEF, July 1984, at 70.
58. See generally Worried Counties Seek Tighter Liability Guards, J. Times (Racine,
Wis.), Jan. 30, 1986, at 6A col. 1 (Wisconsin counties may recommend that the state
legislature enact a limit on the size of awards against county-owned vehicles); Byles,
Insurance is Too Costly for Some, J. Times (Racine, Wis.), Nov. 18, 1985, at 1A, col. 2
(Racine's premium costs have risen 300% in recent years); Shepard, Cities Dig Deeper
for Lawsuit Policies, Milwaukee J., July 11, 1985, at 4, col. 3 (many cities have exper-
ienced up to 150% increases in insurance premiums).
59. See generally Sorry,Your Policy is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16 [herein-
after TIME] (police patrols in many locales have been temporarily suspended because of
lack of liability insurance); Some Counties Halt Services as Insurance Ends, Milwaukee
J., Jan. 2, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 3 (several rural counties in Wisconsin have drastically
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
This means that many municipalities, townships and even
some county governments, already struggling with the prob-
lem of funding essential public services from a diminishing
revenue base, must now contend with the prospect of self-in-
suring the high-risk work activities of their law enforcement
personnel.
In light of this predicament, and given the public's height-
ened concern over highway safety, courts and legislators will
be more inclined to carefully scrutinize those actions of police
officers which have the highest potential for incurring liabil-
ity.60 A reweighing of public policy considerations in the ar-
eas of police firearms practices and domestic abuse arrest
procedures is already well underway. 61 A similar re-evalua-
tion is likely to take place in the realm of pursuit driving, a
police activity described in a recent study as "the most deadly
force."' 62 The latter will most likely be subjected to the same
kind of narrowing of police officer discretion that occurred in
these two other high risk police activities. Courts may even
hold police officers more accountable for the consequences of
their actions in pursuit driving because of the clear signal that
they have received from the legislature. Also, considering the
very real possibility that they will be named as party defend-
ants in pursuit-connected litigation,63 police administrators
will very likely respond to this threat of liability in the way
many of them have reacted to misuse of firearms and domestic
abuse cases.64 They will respond by defending themselves as
best they can through adopting and enforcing more restrictive
pursuit policies and improving training and supervision.
reduced patrol operations because of the problem of obtaining liability insurance
coverage).
60. Telephone interview with Lynn S. Adelman, Wisconsin State Senator and au-
thor of 1985 Wis. Laws 82 (Dec. 8, 1986). See Wis. STAT. §§ 343.31(3)(d), 346.17(3),
346.03(6) (1985-86).
61. See generally Sherman, Reducing Police Gun Use: Critical Events, Administra-
tive Policy and Organizational Change (M. Punch, ed., THE CONTROL OF POLICE OR-
GANIZATIONS, 1983); see also Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest
for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261 (1984).
62. Alpert & Anderson, The Most Deadly Force: Police Pursuits, 3 JUST. Q. 1, 3
(1986) (indicating that "weapons are used in a very small percentage of police activity
as compared to the use of the squad car").
63. See Schmidt, supra note 6, at 200.
64. See generally Milton, Halleck, Lardner & Albrecht, Legal and Administrative
Restraints on the Use of Deadly Force (L. Territo, ed., Police Civil Liability, 1984).
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B. Good Faith Compliance with Guidelines as Defense to
Pursuit-Related Lawsuits
A second issue arising out of the development of internal
departmental policy on police high speed pursuit is the ques-
tion of whether good faith compliance with such a policy acts
as a defense to shield the officer and the employer from liabil-
ity for pursuit-incurred personal injury or property damage.
Obviously, a defendant police officer who deliberately disre-
gards a departmental directive regulating police chases would
have difficulty claiming "good faith" as a defense to a suit for
negligent pursuit.65 Nor would this defense presumably be
available where a pursuing officer claims to have misinter-
preted written departmental guidelines. In such cases, an ac-
tion for injury or damage caused by a negligently conducted
pursuit might also be brought against the officer's department
under the theory that the department failed in its duty to en-
sure that the officer understood the procedure in question, and
that failing to do so was the proximate cause of the improper
conduct which harmed the plaintiff.
However, certain situations will invariably arise where the
prescribed departmental directives are of little or no help to
the officer in pre-pursuit or actual pursuit situations, notwith-
standing the officer's willingness and ability to comply. 6 6 In
65. See, eg., Dehner v. California Highway Patrol, 147 Law Enforce. Leg. Liab.
Rep. (AELE) at 9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1985). In this case, the California Highway
Patrol (CHP) entered into a twelve million dollar settlement for injuries sustained by a
plaintiff who was struck by a motorist after a CHP officer crossed all lanes of traffic on
the Pasadena freeway in an attempt to arrest a speeder. The officer's actions were ap-
parently in violation of CHP pursuit policy and procedure.
His maneuver allegedly caused a drunken motorist, who could not stop, to rear-
end a motorcycle which carried the woman [i.e., plaintiff] as a passenger. She
was thrown under a car and dragged for 300 feet which resulted in the loss of her
right arm and disfiguring scars over 20% of her body. One attorney said, "no
attempt was made to slow the flow of traffic or to give regard to motorists on the
freeway." The settlement, which was reportedly the largest ever obtained from
the CHP, has to be enacted into law by the legislature.
Id.
66. See Lee v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 345, 307 N.W.2d 800 (1981). The police
department policy stated that "[a]ll pursuits shall be terminated when the risks out-
weigh the desirability of apprehension." Id. at -, 307 N.W.2d at 803. Plaintiff's vehi-
cle was struck in an intersection by a van driven by an individual who was being chased
by two patrol cars. Departmental procedure was apparently followed in that both po-
lice vehicles used their sirens and revolving red lights during the entire pursuit, slowed
at all intersections, and maintained appropriate speeds under the circumstances. Fur-
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such cases of inadequate guidance,6 7 if a pursuit-related injury
occurs and negligence is alleged, the question becomes
whether the defense of good faith compliance can be success-
fully raised. Of course, any answer to this question would
probably depend upon the standard used for assessing the care
required of police pursuit drivers in the jurisdiction in which
this defense was asserted.68 In Wisconsin, where an ordinary
negligence standard is used to measure negligence claims
against operators of authorized emergency vehicles,69 the de-
fendant would probably be barred from raising this defense.
In other jurisdictions, where courts have interpreted the stan-
dard of care required of emergency vehicles more liberally in
favor of their operators, the defense of good faith reliance on
existing departmental pursuit policies might well be consid-
ered. For example, where state courts have construed a gross
negligence standard for drivers of emergency vehicles,7° the
defense might be allowed. This is because the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized "good faith" as a defense
to allegations of gross negligence in lawsuits charging govern-
ment violation of individual civil rights.71
Compliance with formal policies and procedures or rules
and regulations has been viewed as an important indicator of
good faith in the performance of official duty.72 Therefore,
following departmental guidelines on pursuit driving should
not be precluded as a defense to the liability of the defendant
officer in those jurisdictions adhering to the gross negligence
thermore, light traffic conditions prevailed in the area of the chase, which occurred on a
Sunday evening. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the trial court's finding that
the police officers were guilty of no negligence was reasonable and proper notwithstand-
ing the fact that the offender, at the inception of the pursuit, was committing no moving
traffic violations and his only offense at the time he was observed was driving while his
operator's license was under impoundment. Id. at -, 307 N.W.2d at 804.
67. See, eg., Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360 (1975). The failure
of a police radio dispatcher to transmit important information to officers in pursuit of a
fleeing motorist traveling 140 miles per hour was evidence of possible negligence. Id.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
69. See cases cited supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text; see also Wis. STAT.
§ 346.03(5) (1985-86).
70. See, eg., Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F. Supp. 271 (D. Vt. 1975) (applying Vermont
law).
71. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). But see Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980).
72. See Stoller v. Marsh, 682 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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standard.73 Even so, regardless of the state standard in effect,
the officer whose department adopts pursuit guidelines that
are inconsistent with what is required by state law, or guide-
lines that fail to address the particular conditions or circum-
stances presented, may still be held liable if it is subsequently
determined that the officer acted carelessly.74
Although no one embodiment of official departmental
guidelines can be expected to anticipate every possible situa-
tion that arises while on patrol, guidelines that do not ade-
quately inform the officer who is confronted with a typical
pursuit decision should be avoided. Where a law enforcement
administrator is legally obligated to provide written guidelines
setting forth a department's policy on high speed pursuit, that
official has a responsibility to provide those under his or her
command with a well-developed set of procedures specific
enough to afford them a reasonable amount of direction.75
Failure to do so means that officers presented with pursuit de-
cisions must rely on their instinctive reactions as well as past
experience. The belief that good judgment plus patrol experi-
ence is enough to get any officer through a pursuit situation
without the need for written guidelines may be true. How-
ever, if injuries or fatalities do -occur, the officer, department
and governmental entity, as well as the taxpaying public, may
be exposed to a greater risk of liability than need be.76 In the
73. See, eg., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1015 (1985) (which immunizes police of-
ficers from civil liability unless their actions are grossly negligent).
74. The classic case of police civil liability arising out of an inconsistency between
state law and local police directive is in the area of liability for police misuse of firearms.
In Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), the defendant police officer was
held liable for shooting the plaintiff, even though he acted pursuant to a standing order
which read in part as follows: "Those people engaged in lawlessness and anarchy must
be stopped. SHOOT TO KILL!" Id. at 127.
75. Prior to 1985 Wis. Laws 82, however, a federal appellate court ruled that there
could be no official liability for not formulating a written policy governing high speed
police pursuits since such a matter was considered a discretionary act, not a ministerial
one. Given the unequivocal mandate of 1985 Wis. Laws 82, it is very doubtful whether
a similar ruling would prevail today. See Dodge v. Stine, 739 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1984)
(applying Wisconsin law).
76. Wisconsin law, as with the law of many other jurisdictions, eg., New York,
Illinois, Massachusetts, provides for the payment of judgments rendered against a law
enforcement officer for liability arising out of performance of official duties. Wis. STAT.
§ 895.46 (1985-86); see Matczak v. Mathews, 265 Wis. 1, 60 N.W.2d 352 (1953); see
also Morrison, Negligent Operation of a Police Vehicle, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 442,
445 (1967).
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highly charged emotional context of hot pursuit, even the
most skilled and experienced pursuit driver may suffer from a
momentary lapse of good judgment and not respond appropri-
ately to a hazard.77 A clear and comprehensive set of pursuit
of guidelines eliminates a great deal of guesswork and will no
doubt answer many legal questions that may ensue from a
high speed chase.
An important issue related to the defense of good faith
compliance is whether mandated pursuit guidelines will ulti-
mately shift the burden of proof from injured plaintiffs to
party defendants, i.e., the officers involved, their departments
and their public employers. Once the plaintiff has set forth a
prima facie case that the defendant officer violated internal de-
partmental directives on pursuit, it becomes incumbent on the
latter to attempt to rebut such evidence by offering evidence of
its own. Where it has been shown to have occurred, a viola-
tion of a police department's general order governing high
speed pursuit carries sufficient weight that the burden falls
upon the defendant to refute or explain the violation.78
Courts seem very willing to allow departmental guidelines to
have this effect, notwithstanding the possible incentive it may
77. See, e.g., Joyner v. District of Columbia, 28 GRIM. L. REP. 2496 (D.C. 1981),
cited in Law Enforce. Leg. Defense Center, Defense of Police Vehicle Related Liability
During Emergencies or Pursuit (AELE) at 20. The appellate court, in upholding the
trial court's finding of liability against police officers and their department for third
party pursuit-related injuries, noted: "While the half minute [Sgt.] Leonard allegedly
had to make his decision [whether or not to abandon the chase] is not a long time, it is
longer than the split second he had to decide to give chase. During this time, he had a
duty to make the difficult decisions inherent in a situation of this kind with due regard
to the safety of other drivers or pedestrians .... "Id.
78. Even though respondeat superior liability of state and local police employers is
no longer barred in Wisconsin, Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115
N.W.2d 618 (1962), if Wisconsin decisions follow the trend set by a number of other
jurisdictions, there are limitations on how far the courts will go in imposing liability on
governmental entities for the negligently conducted pursuits of their law enforcement
agents. Pursuit drivers who knowingly and deliberately violate departmental pursuit
guidelines may be deemed to have significantly departed from the scope of their agency
employment relationship so as to preclude respondeat superior liability. See, e.g.,
Charles v. Town of Jeanerette, 234 So. 2d 794 (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, 256 La. 853,
239 So. 2d 358 (1970) (plaintiff's decedent was shot after a high speed chase which
concluded outside of town; defendant officer, who was held personally liable, created no
respondeat superior liability on governmental employer, since his actions exceeded the
scope of his employment); see also Maynard v. City of Madison, 101 Wis. 2d 273, 304
N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1981).
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have on departmental legal advisers to avoid specificity in
drafting formal pursuit policies.
C. Failure to Implement Written Pursuit Policy Through
Negligent Training and Supervision
Law enforcement agencies, as well as the governmental en-
tities under whose auspices they operate, are almost routinely
named as party defendants in police misconduct litigation,
which includes lawsuits for negligent pursuit driving. 9
Although a plaintiff injured during a high speed chase may
have an immediate cause of action against the named defend-
ant police officer, that plaintiff will usually also sue the of-
ficer's department, the department's top administrator and the
governmental body that employs both. This is because any
substantial damage award against an individual officer, unless
the officer is insured, will be difficult if not impossible to col-
lect. In searching for a "deeper pocket"'80 than that of the
individual officer, plaintiffs will attempt to allocate as much
responsibility as possible for the conduct in question to others
higher in the chain of command. The latter are likely to be
covered by publicly supported liability insurance. Ultimately,
the plaintiff, as a rule, will try to tie the actions of the defend-
ant to the alleged tortfeasor's governmental employer, which
presumably has the resources to compensate the plaintiff for
his or her injuries. Since municipal tort liability may not al-
ways follow the rule of respondeat superior,8' the theory of
79. In Wisconsin, tort claims against municipalities, towns and counties must com-
ply with the statutory requirements of Wis. STAT. § 893.80 (1985-86), which permits
these governmental units to be named as party defendants, but limits monetary recovery
to $50,O00. See Wis. STAT. § 16.007 (1985-86). A claim against the state must be filed
with the State Claims Board. A claim against the federal government must proceed
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
80. See generally Seng, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct, 51 Miss. L.J. 1
(1980). For a discussion of why a victim of alleged police misconduct finds the munici-
pality's "deep pocket" so attractive, see Id. at 23-24.
81. See Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). In
this case, involving alleged negligence of a building inspector, the court held that the
imposition of liability did not always flow from a finding of negligence and cause-in-fact.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held:
[E]ven where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may some-
times be denied on grounds of public policy because: (1) The injury is too re-
mote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly
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recovery often used is that the public law enforcement agency
which employed the officer failed to provide adequate training
and proper supervision.
Where written pursuit guidelines are in effect, the plaintiff,
as well as the defendant officer through an action for indem-
nity,82 may claim that the employing agency failed to reinforce
its formal policy because of inadequate training and improper
supervision. In order to succeed here, the plaintiff must prove
not only that the police department failed in its duty83 to train
and supervise, but that such failure was a "substantial factor"
in causing the plaintiff's injuries.84 For its part, the munici-
pality or other public entity will probably attempt to avoid
liability by claiming that its officer, in conducting the high
speed chase in clear violation of departmental pursuit policies
and procedures, acted without authorization and therefore be-
yond the scope of the official agency relationship.8 5 Notwith-
standing this denial, courts have held that laws aimed at
reducing the level of risk associated with inherently dangerous
police activities impose a duty on police administrators not
only to provide adequate direction86 for their officers but also
extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4)
because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the
negligent tort-feasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to
open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a
field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Id. at 541, 247 N.W.2d at 140.
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. In a number of Wisconsin cases, actions against public officials have hinged on
whether the duty imposed by law on the official is ministerial or discretionary in nature.
In general, public officials are immunized from civil liability in carrying out or failing to
carry out discretionary acts. See, e.g., Dodge v. Stine, 739 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1984);
Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 259 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Lister v. Board of Regents,
72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976). Although the duty to train and supervise
police officers is statutorily imposed, there is considerable discretion on how that train-
ing will be carried out. See Wis. STAT. § 165.85 (1985-86).
84. Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 857, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1975).
85. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-71(o) (West 1986). Smith v. Nieves, 197
N.J. Super. 609, 485 A.2d 1066 (Ct. App. Div. 1984), discusses this law. See generally
Schmidt supra note 6, at 199 (citing Ford v. Brier, 383 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
as an example of a legally imposed duty of police administrators to adequately direct
members of their departments). In Ford, according to Schmidt, the court "found a duty
on the part of the police chief to promulgate written directives dealing with the service
of arrest warrants on the premises of third parties." Schmidt, supra note 6, at 199.
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to make sure that they are suitably trained87 and properly su-
pervised.88 Wisconsin's newly enacted law mandating that
law enforcement agencies provide their officers with written
high speed pursuit guidelines would seem to fall within this
sphere of judicial involvement.8 9
IV. THE LAW IN WISCONSIN
Under common law, individual police officers possessed no
immunity from liability for their negligent acts committed
while pursuing law violators. 90 Even though the governmen-
tal entities that employed them could not be sued under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, 91 no such immunity was af-
forded its public servants.92 Liability was assigned against in-
dividual 6fficials in the same manner as it would be against a
private citizen, that is, according to common law principles of
negligence. 93 Fearing that public officers might be hampered
by the specter of costly litigation and personal liability and
concerned that many competent people would be discouraged
from undertaking public service,94 Wisconsin judges, along
with those in most other jurisdictions, have moved toward
87. See Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied
469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Nieves, 197
N.J. Super. 609, 485 A.2d 1066; see also Peters v. Bellinger, 22 Ill. App. 2d 105, 159
N.E.2d 528 (1959); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960); Peer v.
City of Newark, 71 N.J. Super. 12, 176 A.2d 249 (1961); Meistinsky v. City of New
York, 285 A.D. 1153, 140 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1955), aff'd mern., 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d
900 (1956); Piatkowski v. State, 43 Misc. 2d 424, 251 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1964).
88. See Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 138 P.2d 12 (1943); Grudt v. City of
Los Angeles, 1 Cal. App. 2d 529, 81 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1969), vacated, 2 Cal. 3d 575, 468
P.2d 825, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970); District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159 (D.C.
1982); District of Columbia v. Davis, 386 A.2d 1195 (D.C. 1978); London v. Ryan, 349
So. 2d 1334 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 351 So. 2d 171 (La. 1977); Cutter v. Town of
Farmington, 126 N.H. 836, 498 A.2d 316 (1985).
89. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(6) (1985-86). See supra note 3 for the full text of the sub-
section of the statute.
90. See 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 545(b)(1)(e) (1949) ("[a] municipal of-
ficer is personally liable for damages caused by his negligence"). See generally Annota-
tion, Personal Liability of Peace Officer or His Bond for Negligence Causing Personal
Injury or Death, 18 A.L.R. 197 (1922).
91. See Hayes v. City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314 (1873).
92. See Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N.W. 942 (1904).
93. See Robinson v. Rohr, 73 Wis. 436, 40 N.W. 668 (1889).
94. Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976). The Wis-
consin Supreme Court listed five other public policy reasons weighing toward immunity
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providing protection for officers who cause injury or damage
in the course of their employment. 95
In Wisconsin, public officials charged with carrying out
the law have long been protected from personal liability for
harm resulting from discretionary acts performed within the
scope of their official authority and in the line of duty.96 The
public officer tort immunity afforded Wisconsin peace officers
in the performance of their duties is not founded upon princi-
ples of sovereign immunity, but rather upon principles of pub-
lic policy.97 A policy of not allowing the burden of personal
liability to fall upon the publicly employed tortfeasor whose
enforcement-related negligence harms another has been ac-
complished in this state through a combination of a court de-
cision9" and a legislative enactment99 aimed at limiting the
possibility of negligence actions against public employees.
Also, to some extent, this purpose has been achieved through
statutory indemnification. 100 In Wisconsin, a police officer is
immune from most negligence damage suits;10 1 in those cases
where an officer may be sued for damage resulting from negli-
gently performed law enforcement duties, indemnification ex-
ists for money judgments so rendered. 10 2
from civil liability for negligence actions against public officers. These considerations
are as follows:
(1) the danger of influencing public officers in the performance of their functions
by the threat of lawsuit;
(2) the deterrent effect which the threat of personal liability might have on those
who are considering entering public service;
(3) the drain on valuable time caused by such actions;
(4) the unfairness of subjecting officials to personal liability for the acts of their
subordinates; and
(5) the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are more appropriate
methods of dealing with misconduct in public office.
Id. at 299, 240 N.W.2d at 621.
95. Id. at 300, 240 N.W.2d at 621. See generally 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers
and Employees § 358 (1984).
96. See Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 628 (1867).
97. Pavlik v. Kinsey, 81 Wis. 2d 42, 49, 259 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1977).
98. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300, 240 N.W.2d at 621.
99. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(4) (1985-86).
100. Wis. STAT. § 895.46 (1985-86); see supra text accompanying note 76.
101. Wis. STAT. § 893.80 (1985-86).
102. WIs. STAT. § 895.46 (1985-86).
[Vol. 70:237
1987] POLICE LIABILITY AND HIGH SPEED PURSUIT 261
The immunity afforded public employees in Wisconsin, in-
cluding those working in law enforcement, is not absolute. 0 3
Section 893.80(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes confers tort im-
munity on public employees of local and county units of gov-
ernment for acts done in the exercise of certain kinds of
functions, namely those categorized as either "legislative,"
"judicial," "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial.'
In a series of cases involving immunity for public officers,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempted to define and apply
the term "quasi-judicial" in the context of various official ac-
tivities. In Salerno v. City of Racine,05 the court character-
ized "quasi-judicial" as entailing, at least in part, "an exercise
of a discretionary right by the public official involved."' 1 6 In
Lister v. Board of Regents,10 7 the court reinforced this notion
by tying the principle of tort immunity for public officers to
the judgment or discretion which such officers exercise in per-
forming their official duties. The court declared public officers
immune from liability only for their discretionary acts carried
out in the course and within the scope of the public service. 08
The Lister decision also acknowledged an important exception
to the public officer immunity rule. Where a public officer
negligently performs a ministerial act, that officer may be lia-
ble to someone injured or otherwise harmed as a result of the
officer's negligence. 10 9 A ministerial act was defined as one
103. Pavlik v. Kinsey, 81 Wis. 2d 42, 50, 259 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1977).
104. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(4) (1985-86), provides:
No suit may be brought against any v6lunteer fire company organized under ch.
213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency thereof for
the intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or employes nor may any suit
be brought against such corporation, subdivision or agency or volunteer fire
company or against its officers, officials, agents or employes for acts done in the
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The above-mentioned categorization of functions is derived from language used by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 40, 115
N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962). See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT-1976
(cited in WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (West 1983)). Holytz abrogated the doctrine of
governmental immunity from tort liability, but made no attempt to modify our existing
common law regarding individual liability of public employees.
105. 62 Wis. 2d 243, 214 N.W.2d 446 (1974).
106. Id. at 249, 214 N.W.2d at 449.
107. 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).
108. Id. at 300, 240 N.W.2d at 621.
109. Id. at 300-01, 240 N.W.2d at 621-22. This ministerial exception to the rule of
tort immunity for public officers actually predated Lister and can be found in Clausen v.
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"involving merely the performance of a specific task when the
law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occa-
sion for its performance with such certainty that nothing re-
mains for judgment or discretion." 110
In Coffey v. City of Milwaukee,111 the court elaborated fur-
ther on the need to identify an official act as discretionary as a
precondition for determining whether or not an action is
"quasi-judicial" and thereby "cloaked in the doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity."' 1 2 The Coffey decision also reaffirmed,
although in a somewhat roundabout fashion, the inverse of the
doctrine, namely, that immunity does not attach to ministerial
acts.1 3 In rejecting the contention that a building inspector's
task was quasi-judicial in nature, and therefore, immune from
tort liability, the court saw as significant the fact that the duty
to inspect is statutorily imposed.114 The court noted:
There is no discretion to inspect or not inspect. Violations
exist or do not exist according to the dictates of the regula-
tions governing the inspection, and not according to the dis-
cretion of the inspector. As to the actual conducting of the
inspection, no essentially judicial procedures are accorded to
the building owner. Only when it is determined that viola-
tions do exist, might quasi-judicial actions take place involv-
ing enforcement procedures. But the actual inspection as is
involved here does not involve a quasi-judicial function.115
In refusing to extend tort immunity to public employees
for their ministerial acts, but allowing it to operate as a barrier
to negligent claims that derive from acts defined as discretion-
ary, Wisconsin courts are by no means alone. Most jurisdic-
tions presently adhere to this test and allow the imposition of
liability only where the negligent act in question has been
shown to be ministerial." 6 In cases where negligent police
pursuit has been alleged, the discretionary immunity defense
Eckstein, 7 Wis. 2d 409, 97 N.W.2d 201 (1959); Meyer v. Carman, 271 Wis. 329, 73
N.W.2d 514 (1955).
110. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301, 240 N.W.2d at 622.
111. 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
112. Id. at 531-33, 247 N.W.2d at 132-36.
113. Id. at 533-34, 247 N.W.2d at 136.
114. Id. at 534-35, 247 N.W.2d at 136.
115. Id. at 534-35, 247 N.W.2d at 136-37.
116. See, e.g., Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360 (1975).
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has been successful in some jurisdictions,1 1 7 while unsuccess-
ful in others.1 1 8
A better course of judicial action is the one followed in a
minority of jurisdictions 9 These courts have entirely re-
jected the discretionary/ministerial test in favor of one which
tries to strike a balance between the public policy considera-
tions of citizen safety, governmental efficiency and fair alloca-
tion of the costs of plaintiffs' injuries. 120 Just as the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has repudiated other artificial distinctions
used to prevent the imposition of civil liability for public of-
ficers and employees (e.g., "public duty/special duty," ' or
"proprietary function/governmental function" 122), the court
should dispose of the discretionary/ministerial distinction in
similar fashion. As the court suggested in Coffey, claims
against governmental bodies and their employees or agents
ought not to be disposed of by simply and routinely applying
some arbitrary test before they are given a trial on the mer-
its.1 23 The decision to impose liability where it has been
shown that police negligence was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury is ultimately a decision based on "public pol-
icy considerations and requires the balancing of various policy
factors." 124
Since Lister's restatement of tort immunity for public of-
ficers,125 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not had occasion
to rule on whether or not this doctrine applies to negligent
high speed police pursuit. Nor does the statute governing
claims against public officers and employees speak specifically
117. See, eg., Bratt v. City & County of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 550, 123
Cal. Rptr. 774 (1975) (the initial decision to engage in pursuit as well as the subsequent
decision to continue pursuit were ruled discretionary and therefore covered by immu-
nity provisions of CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 820.2).
118. See Smith v. Nieves, 197 N.J. Super. 609, 485 A.2d 1066 (Ct. App. Div. 1984)
(pursuit held to be ministerial in nature and not immunized under N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 59:2-3(a)); see also Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cerL
denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985) (pursuit described as ministerial and thus exposed to
liability).
119. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
120. Id. at 243.
121. Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 540, 247 N.W.2d at 139.
122. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962).
123. Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 540, 247 N.W.2d at 139.
124. Id. at 543, 247 N.W.2d at 140-41.
125. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300, 240 N.W.2d at 621.
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to this issue.1 26 While Wisconsin law provides tort immunity
for official acts which fall within certain categories of govern-
mental function (e.g., "quasi-judicial"),12 7 it is by no means
clear whether or not a high speed police chase, permitted
under section 346.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes,1 28 will be
viewed by courts as coming within one of those areas so as to
be covered by the immunity provisions of section 893.80(4).
It has yet to be determined what effect the latter statute's gen-
eral immunity provisions have on section 346.03, which estab-
lishes the duty of a police pursuit driver,12 9 specifies what he
or she must do to give proper warning,1 30 and denies protec-
tion to the negligent officer for the consequences of his or her
"reckless disregard for the safety of others."1 3  At least one
writer is of the opinion that a general immunity statute would
not bar a cause of action for negligent high speed chase where
another statute specifically mandates a duty of due care in
emergency vehicle operations. 132 Such is the case in
Wisconsin.
Some sense of how Wisconsin courts might reconcile the
apparent conflict between sections 893.80(4) and 346.03(5) in
deciding if tort immunity applies to negligent police pursuit
may be drawn from a series of Wisconsin cases involving alle-
gations of negligence on the part of public employees. An im-
portant issue in all but one 133 of these cases was whether
126. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(4) (1985-86).
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 3 & 28 for text and discussion of the statute.
129. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(5) (1985-86) defines this duty as "the duty to drive with
due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons."
130. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(3) (1985-86) provides that warning of an approaching
emergency vehicle be given as follows:
[Tihe visual signal given by a police vehicle may be by means of a blue light and
a red light which are flashing, oscillating or rotating. The exemption granted by
sub. (2)(b), (c) and (d) apply only when the operator of the emergency vehicle is
giving both such visual signal and also an audible signal by means of a siren or
exhaust whistle ....
131. Wis. STAT. § 346.03(5) (1985-86).
132. See I. SILVER, supra note 16. Professor Silver cites as an example the Florida
case of Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1985). In this case, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled that the broad immunity provisions of FLA. STAT. § 768 did not supercede
FLA. STAT. § 316.075(5), which defines the duty of an emergency vehicle driver and
creates liability for negligent violation of such duty.
133. Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 259 N.W.2d 537 (1977). Although the
Lifer case was decided on grounds other than § 895.43, subsequently renumbered as
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certain specific acts of public officers could be properly catego-
rized as "quasi-judicial" within the meaning of section
893.80(4).134 Some of the acts in question were carried out
pursuant to or regulated by specific statutory law, which
makes them analogous to high speed police chases under the
emergency vehicle statute.
In Coffey v. City of Milwaukee,1 35 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the inspection of a building in order to deter-
mine whether code violations existed, under section 101.14 of
the Wisconsin Statutes, was an act which did not involve a
quasi-judicial function. 136 The court anchored its denial of
statutory immunity on the specific nature and characteristics
of the act itself. "The duty to inspect is statutorily imposed.
There is no discretion to inspect or not inspect." 137
In Lifer v. Raymond,13 8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that the act of issuing a driver's license under section
343.06(7) of the Wisconsin Statutes was immune from liabil-
ity. 13 9 Although the holding of the Lifer case did not rest on
section 893.80(4), the decision has a bearing on section
893.80(4) public employee tort immunity because of impor-
tant dictum. By declaring the terms "quasi-judicial" and
"discretionary" to be "synonymous," the court, in effect,
adopted the discretionary/ministerial test for applying tort
immunity under section 893.80(4).140 According to this test,
acts of public employees which involve the exercise of judg-
ment or discretion, rather than the mere performance of a pre-
scribed task, come under the protection of statutory
immunity. 141
In Pavlik v. Kinsey, 142 decided shortly after the Lifer case,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a complaint accusing
public employees of negligence in failing to follow state stan-
§ 893.80, it contains important dictum about this general immunity statute and was
therefore included along with the other cases.
134. See supra note 14.
135. 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
136. Id. at 534-35, 247 N.W.2d at 136-37.
137. Id. at 534, 247 N.W.2d at 136.
138. 80 Wis. 2d 503, 259 N.W.2d 537 (1977).
139. Id. at 511, 259 N.W.2d at 541.
140. Id. at 512, 259 N.W.2d at 542.
141. Id. at 509, 259 N.W.2d at 540.
142. 81 Wis. 2d 42, 259 N.W.2d 709 (1977).
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dards for the construction of a temporary highway and failing
to post warning and reduced speed limit signs was sufficient to
state a cause of action alleging breach of a ministerial duty. 143
Therefore, a demurrer to the complaint was properly over-
ruled. Significantly, the court relied exclusively on the discre-
tionary/ministerial test in determining that the complaint was
minimally sufficient. 1" Ministerial duties, according to the
court, were duties that were "mandatory in nature .. im-
posed by law upon subordinate employees." 145
In Maynard v. City of Madison,146 the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals held that Madison police officers who edited reports
of police informers for public inspection performed discretion-
ary tasks rather than ministerial functions, and that therefore
the duty to protect an informant's identity was nonminis-
terial. 147 Thus, the police officers were not individually liable
because of the "general rule" that "a public employee who
acts within the scope of his official authority and in the line of
his official duties is immune from personal liability. 1 48 How-
ever, the City of Madison was held liable under the theory of
respondeat superior because the actions of the police officers
in carrying out the city's policy to release intelligence reports
"were not judicial or quasi-judicial" under section
893.80(4). 149 According to the court,"[a] quasi-judicial act in-
volves essentially judicial procedures such as notice, hearing,
exercise of discretion and a decision on the record."1 50 The
acts in question were found to be deficient in that they did not
include these procedures. 51
In Domino v. Walworth County, 52 a motorcyclist who was
injured when her motorcycle struck a tree which had fallen
143. Id. at 51, 259 N.W.2d at 712.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 52, 259 N.W.2d at 713.
146. 101 Wis. 2d 273, 304 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1981).
147. Id. at 280, 304 N.W.2d at 167.
148. Id. at 279, 304 N.W.2d at 167. On a related issue, which is likely to arise in
cases involving high speed pursuit, the court noted "that failure by a public officer to
exercise ordinary care in the performance of a discretionary act does not, as a general
rule, put the act beyond the scope of the officer's authority." Id. at 282, 304 N.W.2d at
168.
149. Id. at 283, 304 N.W.2d at 168-69.
150. Id. at 282, 304 N.W.2d at 168.
151. Id. at 283, 304 N.W.2d at 168.
152. 118 Wis. 2d 488, 347 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1984).
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across a road sued to recover for her injuries, charging negli-
gence on the part of a sheriff's department dispatcher. The
dispatcher had received a report of a downed tree on the road
and had assigned a squad to investigate. While enroute, the
squad was diverted by the dispatcher to an accident involving
personal injuries. No other squads were assigned to investi-
gate the report, nor were any local town agencies notified.
The issue on appeal was whether the actions of the dispatcher
fell within the immunity provisions of section 893.80(4). The
court of appeals ruled that her actions were not sufficiently
discretionary so as to be immunized by the statute.15 3 On the
contrary, the court held that the dispatcher's duties, under the
facts of the case, "appear absolute, certain or imperative," and
thus the county was not immune to suit for the alleged breach
of this ministerial duty. 154 To conclude otherwise, "would ef-
fectively emasculate the holding of the supreme court in
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee abolishing municipal immunity
from tort liability because nearly every human action involves
the exercise of some discretion." 155
Based upon the analysis of the above cases, several infer-
ences may be drawn about how Wisconsin courts might han-
dle a case of negligent high speed pursuit. While the decision
of a police officer to pursue a suspect appears discretionary
and therefore would probably be ruled immune from the im-
position of liability, how that decision is carried out may very
well involve duties which are ministerial and which expose
both the officer and the employer to liability. Furthermore, as
the highest court within the state has pointed out, even where
an officer has made an initial discretionary-type decision
which "itself would be immune from the imposition of liabil-
ity, the very officer who made the immune decision may nev-
ertheless be subject to liability as a public officer for the breach
of the ministerial duty imposed by that decision."1 56
In time, Wisconsin courts may very well find the inher-
ently defective discretionary/ministerial criterion to be un-
workable. If and when that time arrives, they may well be
153. Id. at 492, 347 N.W.2d at 920.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 491-92, 347 N.W.2d at 919 (citations omitted).
156. Pavlik, 81 Wis. 2d at 51, 259 N.W.2d at 712.
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advised to follow the course charted by the court in the Coffey
decision and weigh each case on the basis of public policy con-
siderations. 15 7 In so doing, the courts will be acknowledging
that police officers require a certain amount of latitude in or-
der to adequately perform the duties expected of them. No
judge wants to deter effective law enforcement by making po-
lice officers and their governmental employers overapprehen-
sive about being liable for damages arising out of good police
work. Yet, tort immunity is something that should be allowed
sparingly and only in those instances where imposing liability
would hinder important police functions.
V. IN SEARCH OF A MODEL PURSUIT POLICY
Under what circumstances should a high speed pursuit be
permitted? In attempting to clarify this issue and provide a
basis for a model pursuit policy it would seem appropriate to
enlist the technical assistance of social science research.
158
Unfortunately, little empirical research has been done on the
many variables that enter into pursuit driving and how they
relate to the dual objectives of citizen safety and offender ap-
prehension. 15 9 In fact, Professors Alpert and Anderson, in
their in-depth analysis of empirical studies, were able to dis-
cover only five such studies, but concluded that four of these
were "so methodologically flawed that the data [was] not
meaningful." 160 The one study that was deemed worthwhile
was carried out by the California Highway Patrol (CHP).1 61
However, another study of police pursuits has since been com-
pleted, and this examination by Professor Beckman of Michi-
gan State University stands as perhaps the most
comprehensive research effort to date.162 A comparison of
these two studies reveals that many of their separate findings
are consistent. Taken together, the CHP and Beckman stud-
ies contain important implications which should not be over-
157. Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 543, 247 N.W.2d at 140.
158. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PER-
SPECTIVE (1975).
159. See generally Beckman, High Speed Chases: In Pursuit of a Balanced Policy,
POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1983, at 34.
160. Alpert & Anderson, supra note 62, at 8-9.
161. CHP, Pursuit Study, supra note 4.
162. Beckman, supra note 4.
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looked by police administrators when considering
departmental policy for high speed pursuits.
The CHP study involved 683 pursuits which took place
primarily on highways and freeways in California.1 63 In addi-
tion to state patrol pursuits, which comprised the bulk of
those analyzed, this study also looked at pursuits by ten city
law enforcement agencies.164 The Beckman study, on the
other hand, included 424 pursuits among seventy-five law en-
forcement agencies in nine states and two territories.1 65 Both
studies revealed that most suspects166 were apprehended re-
gardless of such factors as distance, time of pursuit, type of
roadway, locale, environmental conditions or officer and sus-
pect speed.1 67 Furthermore, most pursuits concluded without
a collision. 168 Approximately one-half of the pursuits ended
through the suspect voluntarily surrendering rather than be-
ing forcibly stopped, although quite a few suspects surren-
dered after being involved in an accident.169 In addition, both
studies indicated that a driver attempts to elude capture gen-
erally for reasons other than being a dangerous felony
offender. 170
While the CHP study found that the pursuit of felony sus-
pects resulted in a much higher collision rate compared to the
collision rate for non-felony pursuits,' 7' Beckman found that
the type of violation preceding the pursuit was unrelated to
the safety of its outcome. 72 Beckman also found that acci-
dents not only occurred within a wide range of speeds, but
163. CHP, Pursuit Study, supra note 4.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Beckman, supra note 4, at 26.
166. The CHP study found that 76.9% of the police pursuits studied resulted in
apprehension, CHP, Pursuit Study, supra note 4, while the Beckman study revealed an
"average capture rate" of 77%, Beckman, supra note 4, at 34.
167. See supra note 166.
168. The CHP sample disclosed that 71% of pursuits ended without collision,
CHP, Pursuit Study, supra note 4, while Beckman found a rate of 75%, Beckman,
supra note 4, at 30.
169. See CHP, Pursuit Study, supra note 4, at 70-71; Beckman, supra note 4, at 30.
170. See CHP, Pursuit Study, supra note 4, at 71-72; Beckman, supra note 4, at 27.
171. CHP, Pursuit Study, supra note 4, at 43 (Table No. 20). Table No. 20 indi-
cates an accident rate of 51.6% for pursuits of known felony suspects, compared to an
average accident rate of 31% for pursuits of non-felony suspects (Le., traffic violators,
DUI suspects, etc.).
172. Beckman, supra note 4, at 27.
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took place over long, as well as short, distances.173 This led
him to conclude that there are no specific limits on distance or
speed that guarantee safety. 174
One finding that Beckman came up with was not reported
in the CHP study. Roadblocks and ramming of fleeing vehi-
cles, which generally had been considered to be especially haz-
ardous, actually increased the apprehension rate while
decreasing the overall injury rate and increasing the suspect
injury rate only slightly.175
Although the CHP and Beckman studies provide much
useful information to police executives charged with develop-
ing departmental pursuit policies, much more empirical re-
search is needed before the knowledge contributed by social
science can truly make a difference. 176 In particular, research
is needed on the way in which various policies impact on field
officer and supervisory discretion in initiating, conducting and
terminatng pursuits. Research is also needed on the deterrent
effect, if any, of different types of pursuit policies on pursued
drivers. For instance, it might be useful to compare the effects
on the ratio of suspects who surrender after vehicular pursuit
to suspects who attempt to elude capture and are either suc-
cessful or forcibly apprehended. 177 Until such research is
available, however, police policy makers and trainers who
seek guidance in formulating and disseminating guidelines on
high speed pursuits have no recourse but to rely upon the pre-
vailing practice within the profession and what the courts
have handed down in past decisions. ' 7  Both of these current
sources of pursuit information will be briefly explored.
173. Id. at 27-28.
174. Id. at 26.
175. Id.
176. See generally Alpert & Anderson, supra note 62, at 11.
177. The CHP study examined 23 independent and 5 dependent pursuit variables
in order to determine causative relationships and significant influences. CHP, Pursuit
Study, supra note 4, at 26 (Table No. 3). However, as Alpert and Anderson point out,
the effect of one variable on others depends upon their combined or total effect. "In
real-life situations these variables exist in some combination, having a joint as well as an
individual effect." Alpert & Anderson, supra note 62, at 8.
178. Alpert & Anderson, supra note 62, at 11.
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A. Customary Practice
In seeking to arrive at a model pursuit policy, one should
also consider the shared knowledge and experience of law en-
forcement professionals. What are the commonly accepted
norms within law enforcement which govern the behavior of
officers engaged in high speed pursuit? More specifically,
what set of circumstances is generally believed to justify the
initial decision to use a police vehicle for this purpose? Ac-
cording to conventional wisdom, when and by whom should
the decision be made to terminate a pursuit? What role, in
general, do supervisory personnel play in making pursuit-re-
lated decisions?
Traditionally, most law enforcement administrators in pol-
icy-making positions have justified the use of high speed pur-
suit to effect the arrest of any actual or suspected felony
offender. 179 The custom in law enforcement is that every rea-
sonable effort may be made to apprehend a fleeing felon, short
of endangering the lives of others. Because of the high risks
involved, ramming a fleeing vehicle occupied by a dangerous
felon is generally considered deadly force, and in many juris-
dictions this practice has been made subject to the kinds of
restraints that are analogous to other forms of deadly force.18
Likewise, roadblocks are viewed as posing too great a risk by
most departments and are therefore usually discouraged, ex-
cept where the fleeing suspect is sought in connection with a
violent felony and the suspect poses a serious threat to the
public.18 1 It is now standard practice in almost all jurisdic-
tions to require supervisory personnel to approve the setting
up of a roadblock prior to using this tactic.182
A common belief in law enforcement circles has long been
that non-felony offenders who are imperiling the lives of inno-
179. See generally Cunningham, Tactical Driving: A Multifaceted Approach, 55
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 18, 19 (Sept. 1986) ("The main reason law enforcement
began to use motor vehicles was to pursue serious offenders who used vehicles to effect
their escape .... ").
180. E. DOUGHERTY, SAFETY IN POLICE PURSUIT DRIVING 52-53 (1961). But see
Beckman, supra note 4, at 34 (study revealed that rammings actually increased the cap-
ture rate "while decreasing the overall injury rate and increasing the suspect injury rate
only slightly").
181. See Territo, supra note 10, at 33-34; see also 45 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 152
(1956).
182. See generally J. SCHWARZ, POLICE ROADBLOCK OPERATIONS (1962).
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cent motorists or pedestrians through their reckless driving
are appropriate cases for limited high speed pursuit. 8 3 Driv-
ing under the influence of an intoxicant or drug, running a red
light, as well as other vehicular code violations that pose an
imminent threat to public safety, are widely believed to war-
rant moderate to high speed pursuit. 184 Other traffic law vio-
lations that impose no immediate threat to the public do not
merit the same degree of risk during pursuit. 185 Although
such decisions are generally left to the discretion of the ob-
serving officer, it is the opinion of many law enforcement pro-
fessionals that where no danger is imminent, excessive speed
in pursuit of the minor traffic violator poses an unnecessary
risk to the pursuing officer, as well as to the public, and there-
fore is not warranted. 86 As one veteran observer pointed out,
"[i]f it is likely that an offender of lesser importance could be
picked up later, the officer must decide between hot pursuit at
the peril of highway users as well as himself or positive identi-
fication of the driver and subsequent service of a warrant
under more favorable conditions."1 8 7
In addition to offense type and severity level, there are
other elements that enter into the shared experience and cus-
tom of high speed pursuit. Pursuit of violators has been car-
ried out under all kinds of road, traffic and weather
conditions. A chase may take place at any time of day or
night under varying degrees of visibility. It may traverse con-
siderably different physical terrain. It may begin in a sparsely
populated suburban area and lead to crowded city streets. It
may carry the pursuing officer from industrial to residential or
business districts. It may involve school zones, parks, dead-
end side streets and blind alleys totally unfamiliar to the of-
183. See, e.g., Schultz, High Speed Chases: Vehicle Pursuit vs. the Lawsuit, POLICE
CHIEF, Jan. 1983, at 32-33.
184. See International Association of Chiefs of Police, Resolution Adopted at An-
nual Meeting, Oct. 1966, which supports high speed pursuit driving to "accomplish the
legitimate objectives of law enforcement."
185. See E. DOUGHERTY, supra note 180, at 27.
186. See, eg., Wis. Council for Traffic Enforcement, Governor's Office of Highway
Safety, Model Policies and Procedures for Wisconsin Law Enforcement Agencies: Pursuit
Driving (1977). The board favors a policy of "moderate speeds, if necessary, to appre-
hend motor vehicle operators who have committed traffic violations." Id. at 1 (empha-
sis in original).
187. E. DOUGHERTY, supra note 180, at 25.
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ficer. The officer's training and experience in dealing with
various pursuit situations may also vary considerably.
The fact that there are numerous possible variations of
these as well as other circumstances that the driver of a pur-
suit vehicle may have to contend with is why the pursuit
method of apprehending lawbreakers is considered dangerous.
The risk of collision resulting in injury or death to the officer,
the pursued suspect or other highway users is commonly un-
derstood to be relatively high. Therefore, prevailing opinion
among police administrators holds that pursuit decisions, in-
cluding the decision to terminate pursuit, should be arrived at
through weighing the anticipated risks in addition to the
known hazards involved in each case. 188
Most upper to mid-level police managers questioned about
pursuit driving acknowledged that common sense and experi-
ence dictate that it is better to occasionally "let one get away"
than to take undue risks which might bring costly litigation
and invite criticism. 18 9 Among those police officials who hold
command or supervisory positions, the predominant view is
that a high speed chase should always be discontinued when
the safety hazards become too great;190 the exception being
where the pursuing officer has reason to believe that the sus-
pect being chased has committed a violent felony and poses a
clear and immediate threat to the public unless apprehended.
Lesser offenders, particularly those whose identities have been
established through the license plates on their vehicles, do not
justify taking so great a risk since they can probably be appre-
hended at a later date. In the case of an ongoing high speed
chase, some agencies follow the practice of assigning responsi-
bility for monitoring the progress of the pursuit to a member
of the supervisory staff who is instructed to order the pursuit
terminated if the danger of continuing it is too high.1 91
188. See Territo, supra note 10, at 34. Professor Territo of the University of South
Florida directed a nationwide survey of police department policies regarding high speed
pursuits and emergency response. Forty-five agencies from 37 states responded to his
request for information. References to "prevailing opinion" or "predominant view" in
this section of the text are based upon that survey. Id. at 31-32.





What guidance have the courts provided agencies in
search of a rational policy for high speed pursuit? A knowl-
edge of court decisions within the state which pertain to mu-
nicipal liability for pursuit-related damages is essential to
policy development. Prior to the enactment of laws mandat-
ing provisions for written pursuit guidelines, many depart-
mental legal advisors believed that adequate direction was
provided to police personnel in the form of court decisions
construing speed exemption statutes or ordinances, and that
these decisions alone sufficed for a high speed driving pol-
icy.192 They felt that there was no need for promulgating a
separate set of formal policy guidelines. 193 Of course, whether
this belief was justified depended largely upon what one's pri-
mary objective was. If it was simply to fend off lawsuits aris-
ing from negligent police pursuits, relying solely on the
pertinent decisions of the state's appellate courts probably did
offer a trifle more protection from expensive civil litigation
than having specific departmental guidelines against which de-
viations could more easily be proven. Admittedly, as shown
above, the common law standards are less restrictive than are
the standards that departments tend to set for themselves.
194
Despite the somewhat dubious protection that decisional
law provides, the absence of written departmental directives
stressing safe pursuit driving regrettably does little to rein-
force in the minds of young and inexperienced officers the
need to carefully weigh all the risks before and during high
speed chases. Thus, in attempting to avert liability by relying
upon less restrictive and somewhat vague decisional law in
lieu of adopting a formal written departmental policy, law en-
forcement agencies may very well have exposed themselves to
more collisions and greater liability than otherwise needed.
However, many agencies which defined their primary pur-
pose as that of reducing the number of pursuit-related injuries
or deaths opted for the more comprehensive written policy
format which they felt was needed to effectively govern the
manner in which emergency police vehicles were being
192. See E. DOUGHERTY, supra note 180, at 21-22.
193. Id. at 22.
194. See Note, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 70:237
1987] POLICE LIABILITY AND HIGH SPEED PURSUIT 275
used. 195 Their rationale for adopting formal departmental
policy was that if an officer knows that he or she might be held
accountable for violating department rules, that officer will
think twice about taking undue risks.
Regardless of the motives of those agencies which avoid
formal policy directives and rely exclusively on court deci-
sions, the fact remains that many law enforcement agencies in
states without a statutory mandate to provide written pursuit
guidelines do elect to follow this course. 196 For those agencies
without formal guidelines, the direction that they receive var-
ies according to the standards that the courts in their respec-
tive jurisdictions employ for police tort liability cases.1 97
Depending on the jurisdiction, the standard used to define the
scope of police liability is either that of ordinary care or gross
negligence. Courts that have adopted an ordinary negligence
standard for tort claims against the drivers of emergency po-
lice vehicles measure a police officer's pursuit driving by the
care and diligence which a reasonably prudent police officer,
under the same or similar circumstances, would exercise in
the performance of such hazardous police duty.198 However,
courts that assign culpability only for gross negligence gener-
ally relieve the police of liability for the consequences of a
high speed pursuit unless the pursuit was conducted with
"reckless disregard" for the safety of others.1 99
Under either standard, operators of police pursuit vehicles
are under an obligation to drive with a degree of caution and
at a rate of speed that is reasonable and proper under the cir-
cumstances, with ample concern for such factors as traffic,
road conditions and population density. In general, courts
will not condone pursuit driving which carelessly endangers
life or property or which demonstrates a total indifference to
others legitimately using the streets.
195. See Schmidt, supra note 6, at 200. Schmidt refers to this phenomenon as "a
new morality" in law enforcement leadership.
196. See generally Carlin, supra note 20. Carlin's research reveals that in particular
"many smaller police departments have no written pursuit policy." Id. at 113 n.104.
197. See Burnette v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 107 Wis. 2d 361, 320 N.W.2d
43 (Ct. App. 1982); supra text accompanying note 38.
198. See, eg., Zulauf v. State, 119 Misc. 2d 135, 462 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1983).
199. Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F. Supp. 271, 274 (D. Vt. 1975).
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In the final analysis, court decisions do not offer a great
deal of guidance to the police planner or legal adviser seeking
to develop a comprehensive policy for high speed pursuit. De-
cisional law tends to be most useful to those who have inter-
ests in damage actions in the nature of establishing
governmental tort liability, or, conversely, in avoiding or lim-
iting the same. In construing emergency vehicle statutes in an
effort to determine the duty of care owed by operators of po-
lice pursuit vehicles, courts are prone to view pursuit-related
issues in terms of whether minimum requirements were met.
Questions of whether an actual emergency existed200 or what
constitutes adequate warning of approaching emergency vehi-
cles 2°1 are usually addressed in language which sets forth the
lowest level permitted by law. Such pronouncements are not
very instructive to police policymakers faced with balancing
society's need to apprehend law violators with the individual
citizen's right to safe use of public roads. 2
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the courts have shown an increased will-
ingness to impose civil liability on police officers for the conse-
quences of negligent high speed pursuit. Furthermore, a
200. See Merlino v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 571, 127 N.W.2d
741 (1964). "[A] police ambulance is clearly an 'authorized emergency vehicle' within
the definition set forth in § 340.01(3)... [and it] is only when responding to an emer-
gency call that he is excused from observing certain rules of the road." Id. at 583-84,
127 N.W.2d at 748.
201. See Pedek v. Wegemann, 271 Wis. 461, 74 N.W.2d 198 (1956). In this case,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that although a police pursuit driver was operating
an emergency vehicle, he did not come under the statutory exemption as to speed regu-
lations because his siren was not in operation prior to the intersection collision of his
motorcycle and a car operated by the defendant.
202. Professor Territo identified eleven "components that have significant bearing
on... pursuit-related accidents" and which therefore should be addressed in developing
a comprehensive police pursuit policy. They are: "[T]he decision to pursue; use of
emergency equipment; silent runs; speed limitations; number of pursuit vehicles; un-
marked vehicles; non-police passengers; shooting at vehicles; ramming vehicles; estab-
lishing roadblocks; and termination of pursuit." Territo, supra note 10, at 32.
Appended to this article is a partial draft of a proposed pursuit policy and proce-
dure, written by Lt. Douglas Van Buren of the Wisconsin State Patrol, incorporating
Territo's main policy components and adding several other elements not included in
Territo's checklist. The draft proposal is exemplary not only for its thoroughness but
also for the way it complies with the statutory requirements of 1985 Wis. Laws 82. As
such, it could well serve as a model for high speed police pursuit in any jurisdiction.
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growing number of courts appear inclined to extend liability
to police supervisors and administrators for the negligently
conducted pursuits of subordinates under the twin theories of
improper training and inadequate supervision. This trend,
coupled with enlightened self-interest, has probably led many
law enforcement agencies to intensify pursuit driver training
and require close supervision in pursuit situations. While im-
proved training and supervision may result in a decrease in
collisions where personal injury and property damage occur,
courts must be mindful of other possible repercussions that
may follow in the wake of the widening scope of police
liability.
While a jury may be reluctant to impose personal liability
for damages on the individual officer who actually commits
the careless act, the same jury may not be so hesitant in deal-
ing with the deeper pocket of those police officials responsible
for determining pursuit policy. Since these officials are almost
always indemnified by their government employers for mone-
tary judgments assessed against them, juries desiring to com-
pensate innocent victims of negligent pursuit have shown a
tendency to render rather substantial damage verdicts against
these party defendants. Larger damage awards, in turn, have
led many insurance carriers to multiply annual premium costs
for police liability coverage or to back away from writing such
policies altogether. As a result, municipal and town govern-
ments throughout the United States, already hard pressed fis-
cally, are creating self-insurance funds, 20 3 banding together to
form insurance pools2°4 or taking their chances by going unin-
203. The City of Milwaukee is typical of many municipalities that are unable to
acquire excess liability insurance. As a result, the city is uninsured in matters of general
liability. Steps are currently being taken to create a self-insurance fund. Interview with
Gregory Gunta, Assistant Milwaukee City Attorney and Acting Risk Manager, in Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin (Feb. 13, 1987).
204. Mr. Mark Rogacki, Executive Director, Wisconsin Counties Association,
predicts that legislation currently in the drafting stage will be adopted which will allow
counties to form insurance pools. The access to larger financial resources provided by
such pools would spread the risk of crippling judgments. Currently, eleven other states
have liability pools. The State of Wisconsin presently operates a high risk insurance
pool for worker's compensation, which counties may join. Interview with Mark
Rogacki, Executive Director, Wisconsin Counties Association, in Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin (Dec. 8, 1986).
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sured.20  A few law enforcement agencies have even felt com-
pelled to curtail patrol services within their jurisdictions for
fear that catastrophic damage awards would leave police ad-
ministrators as well as taxpayers vulnerable.2 °6 Others have
temporarily halted any form of vehicular chase until adequate
liability insurance coverage could be arranged.2 °7 Thus, in a
very real sense, departmental pursuit policy in these jurisdic-
tions has not been shaped by society's interest in appre-
hending law violators, but instead by fear of financially
crippling damage awards.
Despite these concerns, as well as the warnings of police
legal advisers who are worried about the legal ramifications of
specific guidelines, law enforcement agencies and the commu-
nities that they work for are best served by the adoption of
written pursuit policies. For the department that commits it-
self to a sound pursuit policy, the advantages far outweigh any
possible disadvantage in having a standard against which mis-
conduct might subsequently be measured. A well-conceived
policy for pursuit, provided that it is sufficiently reinforced
through training and supervision, will supply an important
check against abuses of the peace officer privilege of utilizing
high speed to pursue known or suspected law violators. Hav-
ing a formal pursuit policy in an agency is an important recog-
nition that the privilege allowing law enforcement personnel
to exceed posted speed limits is a qualified privilege which is
subject to rules and regulations designed to protect all persons
using public streets and highways. Formal guidelines cover-
205. See Byles, supra note 58, at 2A, col. 2 (quoting Bill Martin of the Texas Mu-
nicipal League who compiled a list of one hundred cities in his state that had "gone
bare"); see also TIME, supra note 59 ("Hundreds of other towns in California and in
New York state are 'going bare.' That is, they simply cannot get liability insurance.").
206. The Wisconsin counties of Florence and Oconto are examples of jurisdictions
which curtailed patrol services after being informed that their county vehicle and gen-
eral liability coverage had been discontinued. Florence County deputy sheriffs "were
told to work by telephone out of their homes until the insurance matter was resolved,
and Oconto County deputies were told to park their vehicles" until similar assurances
were received. A total of 23 Wisconsin counties were affected. See Counties Lose Insur-
ance, J. Times (Racine, Wis.), Jan. 2, 1986, at 4A, col. 1.
207. In the Douglas County town of Solon Springs, Wisconsin, the town council
adopted a policy that prohibited its police force from exceeding posted speed limits
when attempting to catch speeding vehicles. The town's only police officer resigned in
protest. See O'Meara, Brakes Put on Constable, Milwaukee J., Apr. 10, 1986, at 3A,
col. 6.
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ing high speed pursuit not only let officers know where they
stand, but they also convey to the motoring public an idea of




PROPOSED HIGH SPEED POLICE PURSUIT POLICY AND
PROCEDURE
I. POLICY
A. General - All emergency vehicle operations shall be
conducted in strict conformity with existing State Statutes.
Division Troopers and Inspectors engaged in emergency vehi-
cle operations shall utilize both audible and visual emergency
warning equipment when engaged in pursuit unless specifi-
cally exempted by statute.
All personnel operating division vehicles shall exercise due re-
gard for the safety of all persons. No assignment shall be of
such importance and no task shall be expedited with such em-
phasis, that the principles of safety become secondary. There
are no tasks of such importance that they justify the reckless
disregard of the safety of innocent persons.
All division personnel will be held strictly accountable for the
consequences of their actions.
B. Pursuit - Pursuit is justified only when the necessity of
immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created
by the pursuit; when the suspect has committed or is attempt-
ing to commit a serious felony; or when the officer knows or
has reasonable grounds to believe the suspect presents a clear
and immediate threat to the safety of others. Additionally,
division employees must necessarily take into consideration
the following:
1. Affected third parties;
2. Existing road and weather conditions;
3. Area demographics and terrain;
4. Traffic conditions;
5. Severity of the known offense;
6. Pursuit speed; and
7. Necessity of pursuit.
C. Termination of Pursuit - The decision to abandon pursuit
may be the most prudent course of action. Troopers must
continually reevaluate the situation and continually question
whether the seriousness of the crime justifies continuing the
pursuit. Troopers will not be censured for terminating pursuit
when, in the officer's opinion, continued pursuit constitutes
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unreasonable risk. Pursuit shall be terminated under any of
the following circumstances:
1. Supervisory personnel order termination of pursuit;
2. The suspect's identity has been established to allow
later apprehension and there is no other need for im-
mediate pursuit;
3. The prevailing traffic, roadway and environmental
conditions indicate the futility of continued pursuit by
creating a situation of unreasonable danger to officers
or other persons in the area which outweighs the com-
peting public interests involved in the apprehension of
the one being pursued; and
4. The pursued vehicle's location is no longer known.
Termination of a pursuit does not prohibit the follow-
ing of a vehicle at a safe speed, or remaining in an area
to reinitiate pursuit if the opportunity and conditions
permit.
II. PROCEDURES
All emergency vehicle operations shall be conducted in strict
conformity with existing State Statutes. Division troopers and
inspectors engaged in emergency vehicle operations shall util-
ize both audible and visual emergency warning equipment
when engaged in pursuit unless specifically exempted by stat-
ute. [The above statement on use of emergency equipment re-
flects a WSP revision of the original draft document.]
A. Primary Pursuing Unit Responsibilities - The officer initi-
ating a pursuit shall, in all cases, notify the communications
center as soon as reasonably possible that a pursuit is under-
way and provide the following information:
1. Police unit identification;
2. Location, speed and direction of travel;
3. Vehicle description, including license number if
known;
4. Reason for the pursuit; and
5. Number of occupants if known.
B. Operational Responsibility - The initiating or primary unit
shall be in field command and bears operational responsibility
for the pursuit unless relieved by a supervisor. The primary
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
unit may maintain pursuit as long as it is safe to do so, or until
directed to terminate the pursuit by a supervisor. The follow-
ing guidelines shall apply:
1. Roadblocks - Generally a roadblock will be employed
only as a last resort. The use of a roadblock must be
directly associated with the seriousness of the crime
for which the suspect is wanted and shall be con-
ducted in strict conformity with the "Use of Force"
policy (5-2) and training bulletin No. Four (4).
2. Ramming - Ramming is authorized only if the use of
deadly force would be authorized under the policy and
procedure of "Use of Force" (5-2), and then only after
all other reasonable means of apprehension have been
exhausted.
3. Use of Firearms - Division policy (5-2) regarding the
use of deadly force shall be strictly followed. Firing in
the direction of or from a vehicle when such force may
legally be used is forbidden if there is likelihood of se-
rious injury to innocent persons or if the use of such
force would likely outweigh the police purpose served.
4. Number of Pursuit Units - The pursuit should be ac-
complished with a minimum number of vehicles. Pur-
suits shall normally be limited to no more than three
chase vehicles. However, the number of units in-
volved may be adjusted to fit the situation.
5. Spacing/Following Distance - All units in pursuit,
whether the vehicle in front is the suspect unit or an-
other police vehicle, shall space themselves at a dis-
tance that will ensure proper braking and reaction
time in the event the preceding vehicle stops, slows or
turns.
6. Unmarked Cruisers and Motorcycles - Officials operat-
ing unmarked cruisers or motorcycles shall yield the
primary pursuing unit position as soon as that position
can be assumed by a marked patrol unit.
7. Aerial Assistance - Aerial assistance will be utilized if
available. When an air unit establishes visual contact
with the pursued vehicle, the ground units shall imme-
diately be notified of that contact. The air unit shall
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direct the movement of the primary pursuit unit and
coordinate assistance of other ground units.
C. Communications Responsibility
1. Clearing the radio frequency when emergency traffic is
broadcast by a pursuing unit;
2. Receive and record all incoming information on the
pursuit and the pursued vehicle;
3. Immediately inform the appropriate supervisor of an
initiated pursuit;
4. Dispatch backup units and provide with relevant
information;
5. Notify other agencies and specify whether assistance is
or is not requested;
6. Perform relevant record and motor vehicle checks;
and
7. Monitor pursuit until termination and advise all af-
fected parties of termination.
D. Supervisory Responsibility - Upon being notified of the
pursuit the supervisor shall at the appropriate time:
1. Assume operational command from the primary pur-
suit unit in those instances when deemed necessary;
2. Ensure that no more or less than the necessary
number of units are involved in the pursuit;
3. Ensure aerial assistance, if available, has been
requested;
4. Ensure proper radio frequency is being utilized;
5. Ensure that an overall analysis and critique of each
pursuit is completed to determine compliance with Di-
vision policy; and
6. Be responsible for submission of analysis to the com-
manding officer. It may be appropriate to have in-
volved officers submit a memorandum and critique
their involvement with the pursuit and subsequent




c. Offenses discovered later;
d. Speeds;
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e. Length of pursuit (time & distance);
f. Injured or killed;
g. Crashes; and
h. Completed or abandoned pursuit.
